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A range of recent books have popularised 
many concepts from these fields and are 
leading an increasing number of people 
outside academia to revisit the way we 
conceive of thinking and decision-making. 
For example, The Wisdom of Crowds 
(Surowiecki, 2004), Blink (Gladwell, 2005), 
The Black Swan (Taleb, 2007), Predictably 
Irrational (Ariely, 2008), Nudge (Thaler 
and Sunstein, 2008), Thinking Fast and 
Slow (Kahneman, 2011) and The Signal 
and the Noise (Silver, 2012) all underline 
the limitations of rational accounts of 
thinking and decision-making.
Perhaps reflecting the new public 
popularity of these fields, it has become 
fashionable in certain circles to consider 
ways to incorporate the findings of 
cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics into the design of policies 
(e.g. Ministry of Economic Development, 
2006; Dolan et al., 2010), often under the 
label libertarian paternalism or choice 
architecture (Thaler, Sunstein and Balz, 
2010). The argument is often that small 
changes in the design of policies can 
nudge choices in a desired direction 
Behavioural economics and the related fields of cognitive and 
social psychology are now very much in the mainstream, as 
the highly visible success of the Behavioural Insights Unit in 
the United Kingdom attests. A robust and diverse range of 
findings about the limits of human thinking challenges policy 
practitioners to reconsider how they both design and advise 
on policies. This challenge is particularly relevant given that 
the training and background of policy advisors typically 
does not include these fields, with political science, law and 
conventional economics much more common. 
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without the need for compulsion. Perhaps 
the best known example is the design 
of KiwiSaver, where the default option 
is automatic enrolment, with people 
required to opt out instead of opt in.  
Cognitive science has also influenced 
the academic analysis of policy, 
particularly of the way cognitive biases 
can affect the agenda-setting process and 
the public communication of policies 
(Araral et al., 2013).
In this article I take a practitioner’s 
perspective on how the insights of 
cognitive psychology and behavioural 
economics also have important 
implications for the nuts and bolts of 
policy advice. I focus particularly on the 
implications of the biases and heuristics 
literature for the way we structure choices 
and provide information to decision-
makers. I argue that this literature 
provides a formal language and a toolkit 
to help policy advisors better understand 
the implications of the advisory choices 
they make.
The biases and heuristics tradition
Neoclassical economics typically relies on 
assumptions of rationality in agents in a 
strict sense. The rational actor paradigm 
has influenced a range of fields, including 
political science and organisational 
decision-making (Jones, Boushey and 
Workman, 2006). At the same time, there 
is a long tradition of treating the decision-
making process as descriptively or 
normatively quasi-rational, or boundedly 
rational. For example, Herbert Simon 
(1956) observed that decision-makers 
often settle for a good enough option, or 
satisfice, rather than seeking an optimal 
solution among all possible alternatives.
The biases and heuristics tradition 
has built further evidence to counter 
the assumptions of the rational decision 
model. Led initially by Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky in the 1970s, there is 
now a wide range of findings showing 
experimentally where judgements differ 
descriptively from those normatively 
prescribed by the rational actor 
paradigm. Researchers have identified a 
range of heuristics, or thinking shortcuts, 
that we commonly use, and which can 
lead to judgemental biases in many 
circumstances. 
The biases and heuristics tradition has 
now been incorporated into a general set 
of dual process theories in psychology. It is 
now understood that there are essentially 
two quite different thinking systems we 
use, including to make decisions (Chaikan 
and Trope, 1999). 
System 1 is the fast system of Thinking 
Fast and Slow, and which operates 
automatically to produce an ongoing 
stream of unconscious judgements using 
the brain’s basic associative machinery. 
System 2 is the slow, deliberate, conscious 
type of reasoning that more closely 
adheres to the type of thinking prescribed 
by a rational choice model. In general 
we use the rapid processes of system 1 
wherever possible, as system 2 is effortful 
to use. 
One classic example of the difference 
between the two systems is the following 
problem from the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (Toplak et al., 2011): 
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. 
The bat costs $1 more than the ball. 
How much does the ball cost?
System 1 will typically generate an 
obvious and intuitive heuristic answer 
unbidden: 10 cents. When asked this 
question, most subjects will in fact give 
that answer and express confidence that 
it is the right answer, including large 
proportions of highly select university 
students at MIT, Princeton and Harvard 
(Frederick, 2005). But only a small amount 
of thought with system 2 is enough to 
convince oneself that the correct answer 
is actually 5 cents. The difficulty is that to 
arrive at the right answer system 1 needs 
to be deliberately overridden, and often 
isn’t.1 
Our minds use many heuristics to 
generate what Gerd Gigerenzer calls ‘fast 
and frugal’ responses to the world, and 
this strategy is largely adaptive. In some 
cases, however, reliance on heuristics can 
lead to biased or inaccurate thinking. If 
our minds can be fooled by such a simple 
task as the bat and ball problem, it seems 
reasonable to ask whether similar errors 
of judgement can be made in more 
complex, policy-relevant domains, by 
both advisors and decision-makers.
 Application to policy advisors and decision-
makers
We are not in a position where we can 
definitively say that policy analysts and 
political decision-makers are riddled 
with thinking biases and judgemental 
errors. Some of the biases and heuristics 
literature has been criticised as narrow 
and artificial, with many results relying 
largely on American undergraduates and 
relatively few studies conducted in real-
life conditions (Klein, 1998; Swoyer, 2002). 
Others have suggested that the language 
of bias is a misleading way to describe the 
phenomena revealed by the literature (e.g. 
Gigerenzer, Hoffrage and Kleinbolting, 
1991).  
However, several phenomena have 
been demonstrated across multiple 
populations, and there is robust evidence 
of several phenomena that should be 
concerning regardless of whether we 
use the language of ‘bias’. For example, 
we should be concerned by findings 
that decision-makers can take different 
decisions based on exactly the same 
information depending on how that 
information is presented.
 We might also wonder whether the 
high levels of cognitive ability that are 
typically present among policy advisors 
and decision-makers protect against 
biases. In recent years, researchers 
have focused on establishing boundary 
conditions and individual differences in 
many of the most important biases, to see 
whether certain individuals or situations 
... decision-makers can take different decisions 
based on exactly the same information depending 
on how that information is presented.
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reduce biases. Indeed, not all biases appear 
to be universal. But Stanovich and West 
(2008) and others have found that several 
biases are uncorrelated with cognitive 
ability, and that cognitive ability does not 
always eliminate other biases even where 
it reduces them. 
There is also evidence that people 
tend to think they are less subject to 
cognitive biases than they are, and that 
if anything this ‘bias blind spot’ may be 
larger for more intelligent people (West, 
Meserve and Stanovich, 2012). It seems 
reasonable to assume that the intelligence 
of policy advisors and decision makers 
is not sufficient to protect against all 
thinking biases or the bias blind spot.
Even if intelligence is not protective 
against all thinking biases, one could 
argue that expertise or experience is 
sufficient to protect us. Klein (1998) 
argues the development of expertise 
leads to effective intuitive judgement 
in most cases. Klein has shown that in 
naturalistic settings, decision-making is 
typically dominated by intuitive, system 
1 judgements, particularly under time 
pressure, and that in many situations this 
naturalistic decision-making provides 
good results, as seen among firefighters, 
nurses and military commanders. 
Against this, judgemental biases have 
also been observed in certain domain-
specific areas of knowledge, suggesting 
that specialist knowledge does not 
necessarily protect against thinking 
biases. For example, doctors have been 
shown to be subject to framing effects 
when considering the risks of different 
treatment options (McNeil et al., 1982), 
and researchers with advanced statistical 
training have been found to display 
errors of mental prediction that conflict 
with basic statistical rules (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1971). 
Shanteau (1992) has offered a general 
framework for when expert intuition 
is likely to lead to effective judgements. 
In general, he argues, experts with 
demonstrably good performance, such 
as weather forecasters, chess masters and 
physicists, tend to work in high-validity 
environments with repetitive tasks, often 
related to physical processes, where 
feedback on judgement performance 
is readily available. In contrast, experts 
with observed poor performance, such as 
clinical psychologists and stockbrokers, 
often work in situations where tasks 
are unique and are related to human 
behaviour, and where feedback on results 
is rare, limited, or long-separated from 
the judgement itself.
According to these criteria, public 
policy would seem to be an environment 
where expert intuition is unlikely to 
produce good judgements on its own, on 
the part of either advisors or decision-
makers, except perhaps in more technical 
areas such as construction policy. Even 
if it were possible to develop effective 
intuitive judgement in the low-validity 
environments common to public policy, 
this is unlikely to work in practice 
because many decision-makers and 
advisors will be exposed to a specific 
policy environment only briefly, will 
work on relatively few policy decisions 
each year, and will often not be sure what 
effect a policy has had, particularly where 
there is no follow-up evaluation. This is 
somewhat concerning, since most policy 
decisions can be characterised as taken on 
at least a semi-intuitive, narrative basis. 
Since ministers typically take decisions 
on a greatly reduced or simplified set of 
information – a ten-page limit, or about 
3-4,000 words, is common for policy 
advice – it is hard to argue that decision-
makers make a comprehensive, rational 
search for the best options in a problem 
space. 
To the extent that advice is given or 
decisions are taken quickly, on partial 
information, on gut feel or the strength 
of the narrative case for change, they are 
likely to be subject to system 1 judgements 
that are known to be subject to many 
important biases. It then becomes 
important for advisors and decision-
makers to consider how these biases 
might be affecting decision-making.
Framing bias and preference reversals
Over two dozen separate cognitive biases 
have been identified, too many to list here. 
But to demonstrate the relevance of the 
literature to policy practice, I will discuss 
briefly one of the most robust areas of the 
literature: framing bias and preference 
reversals. 
One of the most important general 
findings for policy practitioners to 
consider from the biases and heuristics 
tradition is that decision-makers’ 
preferences are typically not fixed, 
and vary depending on how they are 
elicited (Lichtenstein and Slovic, 2006). 
A wide range of different studies has 
shown that two or more options, faced 
with one’s choice of option can change 
systematically depending on how the 
options are communicated, even when 
the content of the options is unchanged. 
This suggests that an important part of 
the policy advisor’s role is to support 
decision-makers to construct their 
preferences, rather than just to generate 
options for appraisal against a fixed 
master list of values.
Policy advisors are familiar with 
the language of framing, but many are 
perhaps not aware that it is possible 
to make formal predictions about how 
certain types of frame will affect decision-
making. The classic example of framing 
effects in cognitive psychology is the 
Asian disease problem, first introduced 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981) and 
subsequently demonstrated in numerous 
experiments. In this experiment, subjects 
are provided identical information and 
asked to choose between two policy 
options. Half the participants are 
randomly assigned to a condition where 
the outcome information is presented 
Policy advisors are familiar with the language of 
framing, but many are perhaps not aware that we 
are able to make formal predictions about how 
certain types of frame will affect decision-making. 
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either in terms of deaths incurred or lives 
saved:
Introductory information (both 
conditions)
Imagine that the US is preparing 
for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected 
to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programmes to combat the disease 
have been proposed. Assume that 
the exact scientific estimates of the 
consequences of the programmes are 
as follows 
First condition (frame)
Programme A: If programme A is 
adopted, 200 people will be saved. 
Programme B: If programme B is 
adopted, there is a 1/3 probability 
that 600 people will be saved, and 
2/3 probability that no people will be 
saved.
Second condition (frame)
Programme A: If programme A is 
adopted 400 people will die. 
Programme B: If programme B is 
adopted there is a 1/3 probability that 
nobody will die, and 2/3 probability 
that 600 people will die. 
Under the first condition, the majority 
of subjects typically prefer programme 
A (are risk-averse), whereas under the 
second condition the majority typically 
prefer programme B (are risk-seeking). 
This particular type of framing bias is 
recognised as a result of prospect theory, 
according to which people are more 
sensitive to losses than to gains, and are 
typically risk-averse in the domain of 
gains and risk-seeking in the domain 
of losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Prospect 
theory helps to explain status quo bias, 
whereby people are more sensitive to the 
losses associated with change than they 
are to the potential gains – typically twice 
as sensitive (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 
1998).
Status quo bias occurs when the status 
quo is implicitly or explicitly used as the 
reference point against which changes 
are measured. In some cases, reference 
points other than the status quo may be 
appropriate to consider. For example, as 
Sunstein (2002) observes: 
In environmental regulation, it is 
possible to manipulate the reference 
point by insisting that policymakers 
are trying to restore water or air 
quality to its state at time X; the 
restoration time matters a great deal 
to people’s choices. (Sunstein, 2002, 
p.221)
It is not at all clear in this example or 
any other whether the status quo reference 
point or the alternative reference point 
is normatively superior in any objective 
sense. The key thing for non-partisan 
civil servants to observe is that the choice 
of reference point can affect choices, and 
so the selection of a reference point has 
an ethical component. 
Prospect theory also provides a useful 
perspective on trial initiatives, as a way 
of shifting the perceived status quo (or 
reference point) in increments, of blunting 
the psychological impact of potential 
losses by allowing for the possibility that 
they can be reversed. 
The area of risk is one that appears 
particularly sensitive to framing effects. 
Because of the way the associative 
machinery of system 1 operates, it is 
difficult for us to maintain conflicting 
ideas about a policy or anything else. 
Our inborn tendency is to generalise that 
something is good or bad, rather than a 
complex mixture of the two. In practice, 
this means that it is cognitively difficult 
to fully accept the risks associated with a 
favoured policy. Stanovich and West (2008) 
described this as the non-separability of 
risk and benefit judgements. In a different 
context this phenomenon is also known 
as the halo effect. 
Along these same lines, Shafir (1993) 
found that the way people are asked to 
evaluate options can affect how they 
evaluate them and can lead to preference 
reversals. Where people are asked to 
choose from a set of options they 
typically think about the positive features 
of the options. Where people are asked to 
reject options, they focus on the negative 
features of the options. So, an option 
with strong positive and negative features 
can be both preferred and rejected over a 
more average option depending on how 
the choice is made.
The precise way risk is communicated 
also appears to be important. For example, 
Slovic et al. (2000) and Dieckmann, Slovic 
and Peters (2009) have documented 
how any expression of risk in terms of 
relative frequencies (such as framing a 
risk of cancer in terms of one person in 
a million) can raise the perceived risk 
by inducing affect-laden images of one 
or more people suffering, particularly 
for less numerate people. Expressing 
the same risk as a probability (.000001) 
leads to a lower perceived risk. Further, 
less numerate people appear more 
likely to rely on the narrative evidence 
accompanying a numerical estimate of 
likelihood, and are more likely generally 
to interpret risk as high, even when the 
objective probability is very low.
Another form of framing effect comes 
from the inclusion of decoy options into 
a choice set. Ariely and Wallsten (1995) 
showed that where two options are quite 
dissimilar, introducing a decoy option that 
is similar to one of the options but clearly 
inferior to it biases decisions towards 
the option that is linked to the decoy. 
Similarly, Sunstein (2002) has observed a 
general tendency to extremeness aversion. 
With two options, say a small and a 
medium option, introducing a third, 
‘large’ option can bias decisions towards 
the medium option.
The way in which options are 
considered also seems to be important. 
Hsee et al. (1999) review a range of 
findings where choices can differ 
Our inborn tendency is to generalise that 
something is good or bad, rather than a complex 
mixture of the two.
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systematically depending on whether 
an option is considered in isolation, 
in series with another option, or side 
by side with the alternative. Hsee et al. 
offer an evaluability hypothesis, whereby 
preference reversals across evaluation 
mode are particularly likely where an 
important criterion is difficult to evaluate 
in isolation. They quote, for example, 
Desvouges et al. (1992), who find that 
when options are considered in isolation, 
subjects show no greater willingness to 
pay to protect 20,000 endangered birds 
over 2,000 or even 200 endangered birds. 
It also appears important whether 
an option is considered from within 
its own domain of value or in a wider 
context. Kahneman and Ritov (1994) 
quizzed members of the public and 
found preference reversals among a series 
of comparisons between environmental 
outcomes and human outcomes, such as 
protecting spotted owls versus improving 
earthquake safety. Under single evaluation, 
subjects tended to state a higher 
willingness to pay for the environmental 
outcome, but when choosing between the 
two in joint evaluation they tended to 
prefer the human outcome. 
A related type of preference reversal is 
known as the ‘less is more’ bias. Slovic et 
al. (2002) and Stanovich and West (2008) 
found that subjects, considering options 
in isolation, rated more highly an option 
that would save 98% of 150 lives than an 
option that saved 150 lives. This is partly 
explained by the affect heuristic, whereby 
98% of a good thing sounds good and 
in itself creates positive affect that can 
bias decision-making. It is also another 
illustration of the evaluability hypothesis, 
and the difficulty of independently 
assessing the value of ‘150 lives’ without 
any kind of comparator.
Implications of framing bias and preference 
reversals for policy advice
There are several important implications 
here, most of which are likely to be 
immediately apparent to practitioners. 
Perhaps the most important is to 
remember that advisors’ own thinking 
and preferences are likely to be biased in 
many situations, and as professionals we 
have a duty to guard against them and 
practice cognitive humility.
Another important implication is that 
most ways of presenting information to 
decision-makers have the potential to 
subtly bias decision-making one way or 
another, and often in predictable ways. 
In one’s own work or in offering second 
opinion advice or peer review, knowledge 
of these effects will help advisors 
understand the influence of one’s advisory 
choices, and to acknowledge one’s ethical 
role in the co-production of government 
policy.
There is clearly the potential for 
these phenomena to be used to push a 
particular agenda. Indeed, it is possible to 
argue that all advice is intrinsically biased 
in one way or another, consciously or 
unconsciously. But we do not necessarily 
need to yield to full relativism. 
Payne, Bettman and Schkade (2006) 
suggest that an effective decision 
analyst will support decision-makers to 
construct preferences that are robust 
to manipulation, by explicitly offering 
multiple perspectives and different frames 
wherever possible. 
More generally, it appears that the 
benchmark or standard chosen for 
comparison of policy proposals is very 
important. For example, decisions are 
likely to be influenced by how and 
whether policy advisors:
• compare options to the status quo or 
a different reference point; 
• provide qualitative or quantitative 
assessment of trade-offs;
• provide alternative options to the 
proposal, including more positive 
options;
• compare the policy proposal to 
others in different domains of public 
value.
A final direct implication is about the 
importance of clearly communicating 
risks or downsides of policy options to 
support sound decision-making. There 
appears to be an underlying cognitive 
bias, for both advisor and decision-maker, 
towards overlooking or downplaying the 
downsides of an option that is favoured. 
One option to deal with this problem 
may be to follow a strategy that leads to 
the rejection, rather than selection, of 
options, as per Shafir’s (1993) findings 
that this can lead to a greater focus on 
downsides. At the same time, it appears 
important that advisors be careful in the 
way they communicate risk, to ensure the 
risks are well understood without leading 
to their cognitive exaggeration. 
Further applications of cognitive psychology 
to the policy process
In this article I have illustrated only 
some of the most obvious applications of 
cognitive psychology to policy practice. 
Other applications could include: 
• The importance of the availability 
bias (overemphasising salient events 
and issues in analysis) and affect bias 
(over-reliance on emotive affect) for 
agenda setting and strategy, such as 
through the briefing to the incoming 
minister process.
• Drawing upon a wider range of 
formal tools for systematically 
evaluating options, such as:
º elimination by aspects (Tversky, 
1972) – an approach to choosing 
between options whereby options 
are eliminated if they fall below a 
threshold on the most important 
attribute, then on the second-most 
important attribute, and so on;
º the Delphi method – a structured 
system for collating individual 
forecasts or predictions into a 
group consensus forecast;
º prediction markets (Surowiecki, 
2004) – markets where people 
... it appears important that advisors are careful 
in the way they communicate risk, to ensure the 
risks are well understood without leading to their 
cognitive exaggeration. 
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trade ‘shares’ that pay out if a 
given outcome comes true, for 
example www.ipredict.co.nz. 
• The importance of training in 
basic analytical concepts where 
misunderstanding can lead to 
analytical biases – such as regression 
to the mean and the rules of 
conjunctive probability, both of 
which have been shown to be 
poorly understood by many people. 
(Kahneman, 2011)
Within the traditional eightfold path 
of policy making (Bardach, 2000), the 
‘tell your story’ phase is perhaps the 
most important part of the process 
to consider from the perspective of 
biases and heuristics, because it entails 
a simplification and perhaps a shift to 
faster, system 1 thinking, with greater 
risk of bias. Even the most rational, 
exhaustive analysis will not necessarily 
lead to rational decision-making if 
distilled to the simplicity of an elevator 
conversation, as is commonly required of 
policy advisors.
Overall, the major general lesson 
for public policy from the biases and 
heuristics tradition may be the finding 
that we are all hardwired to respond well 
to simple causal stories because of the way 
system 1 operates. The problem with this 
is that simple, convincing stories can be 
misleading: ‘Paradoxically, it is easier to 
construct a coherent story when you know 
little, when there are fewer pieces to fit 
into the puzzle’ (Kahneman, 2011, p.201). 
The cognitive seductiveness of a simple 
story should give practitioners pause 
when we consider the recent proliferation 
of advice offered orally or via one-page 
briefings. So too should the common 
practice of providing only one option 
for consideration by Cabinet, or one full 
option with one or two thinly-described 
straw man alternatives, particularly where 
there is no regulatory impact statement in 
support, or when the Cabinet paper is used 
as a communications tool, either explicitly 
or implicitly, in anticipation of release 
under the Official Information Act.
There is a tension between advice 
that is considered good because it tells 
a simple, compelling story and advice 
that is good by some other criteria 
because it adequately communicates all 
complicating and difficult information 
to decision-makers. Simple advice is 
appealing for many reasons, but is 
perhaps more likely to activate system 1 
judgements and is, I would argue, more 
susceptible to cognitive biases. Advice 
that is robust to framing and other biases 
is likely to be substantially more complex 
and place greater demands on decision-
makers, with more emphasis on effortful 
use of system 2. 
We also need to acknowledge that 
this will not always be possible. Research 
into management styles (Tetlock, 2000) 
reminds us that some decision-makers 
are not very concerned by potential 
biases: Tetlock found that many 
organisational managers defend simple, 
heuristic-based errors and prefer simple, 
decisive leadership styles that reduce the 
information load on top management 
and avoid unnecessary argumentation. 
Where constraints of time or space 
mean advisors are denied the luxury 
of offering advice from a range of 
frames or perspectives, perhaps the 
lesson is to acknowledge the risk of bias 
and communicate that clearly, and to 
ensure that the analysis and lower-level 
discussion and debate that underpins the 
final advice has been sufficiently robust 
that the agency offering the advice has 
a good understanding of its limitations 
and potential biases. Related to this is the 
need to carefully examine the language 
used to summarise concepts, as certain 
word choices have strong connotations.
Procedural approaches to considering 
cognitive biases
Awareness of cognitive biases may be 
insufficient to address them. As West, 
Meserve and Stanovich (2012) note, people 
tend to be much better at identifying 
biases in others than in themselves, so 
relying on individuals to tend to their own 
biases is unlikely to be an effective strategy. 
The procedures used during the policy 
development and advice process are likely 
to be important in either exaggerating or 
mitigating thinking biases.
The greatest risk of biased analysis and 
advice is perhaps when the development 
and advice process occurs with a 
particular policy in mind. In this case, 
the confirmation bias can trigger a range 
of other thinking biases, leading analysts 
to unconsciously focus on evidence that 
supports the intended policy, to frame 
the problem in a way that supports the 
change, to communicate the policy in a 
favourable way, to oversimplify the policy, 
and to underplay risks or trade-offs. 
Social norms and group dynamics can 
be particularly powerful impediments to 
overcoming individual-level biases where 
confirmation bias is at work.
A policy development and advice 
process that is robust to thinking 
biases would ideally focus on trying to 
disconfirm proposed options, in the 
same way science proceeds by generating 
hypotheses then seeking ways to disprove 
them. By deliberately considering ways 
in which a proposed policy might fail or 
generate adverse effects, we will be more 
likely to identify flaws in design, recognise 
how framing effects might be leading to 
inflated expectations of success, and gain 
an accurate understanding of risks. 
Procedural options to support a 
disconfirming strategy include:
• the pre-mortem, a deliberate group 
task which asks decision-makers or 
advisors to imagine that a policy 
decision has been implemented and 
has failed, and to write down all 
the reasons why failure might have 
occurred (Klein, 1998);
But the language and concepts of cognitive 
science are not often encountered explicitly, and 
are not typically part of the formal training and 
development of advisors. 
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• wider collaboration and consultation 
with individuals with a different 
point of view, including those who 
are likely to oppose a proposed 
policy and who have an incentive to 
identify flaws in the argument for it 
(for example, the external panel used 
by Treasury in the development of its 
long-term fiscal statement);
• quality assurance processes 
containing a checklist of some 
of the most important biases: 
Gawande (2010) has recently made 
an eloquent case for the importance 
of simple checklists to improve the 
performance of even highly-skilled 
professionals such as surgeons, and 
checklists have been used to great 
effect in aviation to improve the 
performance of pilots.
Procedural checks are perhaps most 
important for reactive, time-pressured 
policy, where biases are more likely. Where 
rapid or reactive advice is needed, a 
simple procedural check to alert decision-
makers to potential biases could be a 
signed statement by the author, covering 
how extensively they have examined any 
relevant literature, how many options 
have been fully developed, and so forth. 
This could provide reason to pause for 
decision-makers, perhaps buying time for 
more considered policy advice with less 
risk of biased analysis.
Conclusion
Effective practitioners will already 
intuitively understand much of what 
I have discussed in this article. But the 
language and concepts of cognitive science 
are not often encountered explicitly, 
and are not typically part of the formal 
training and development of advisors. For 
some advisors and decision-makers, the 
first reaction to the biases and heuristics 
literature may be that it is important for 
the design of policies, but has less relevance 
for the thinking processes of advisors and 
decision-makers. But the evidence to date 
suggests that policy makers may be just as 
subject to biases in their thinking as policy 
takers.
Overall, it appears that much of 
the cognitive psychology literatures are 
developed and widely accepted enough 
now that formal training and a new 
language could usefully be included 
in practitioners’ toolkits, and that as a 
professional community policy advisors, 
public officers and decision-makers would 
do well to reflect on the way we practice 
our craft in light of these findings.
1 This could be seen as an example of the attribute 
substitution heuristic, whereby the mind substitutes an easy 
problem ($1.10 - $1) for a somewhat harder problem (x + y 
= $1.10, y - x = $1, solve for x).
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